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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LABOR RESERVE: 
THE IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE ON BOTSWANA* 
By David Massey 
The framework within which this paper is written is that which is broadly 
referred to as "underdevelopment theory."l This theory challenges the 
contention that Third World labor reserve economies, such as exist in rural 
Botswana, are the natural outcome of regional differentials in productivity. 
It posits instead the thesis that foreign rule or domination in such countries 
played an active role in reshaping the local economic and social fabric in 
such a way as to force an outflow of workers in search of employment. 
The original goal of the British in forming a Protectorate in Botswana was 
to secure the territory from the encroachment of other imperial powers in the 
area. and thus safeguard a transport route to the north. Later, the British 
found that the two goals of making the Protectorate pay for its own 
administration and of supplying the South African economy with migrant workers 
were wholly compatible -- in fact, complementary. The supply of cheap labor 
to the South African economy meant higher returns on British investment in 
that country. During the time frame of this paper (c. 1800 to 1930), British 
capital dominated the burgeoning economy of South Africa. Therefore, it was 
logical that British policy in Botswana should favor the provision of cheap 
labor to South Africa over the encouragement of local development. 
Until recently, most of the history of Botswana has been written by former 
colonial officials. Anthony Sillery, who has written what are considered 
standard works on the political history of the country,2 was a career 
colonial official and resident commissioner in Botswana from 194 7 to 1950. 
Isaac Schapera' s most important works -- his books on law and custom, land 
tenure, and migrant labor3 -- were all researched at least in part ·under the 
sponsorship of and for the use of the colonial authorities. Although both 
authors were somewhat critical of the colonial administration, neither 
considered British rule in the wider context of the country's imperial 
interests in the region. 
Using written and oral sources, this paper will demonstrate how British 
colonial policy, although seemingly less disruptive and less severe than in 
some other colonies, played a significant role in transforming the country 
into a labor reserve. The paper examines three topics: first, precolonial 
society in Botswana: second, the impact of European contact from c. 1800 
through the great Rinderpest Epidemic of 1896; third, the means by which 
British colonial policies had transformed most of Botswana into a labor 
reserve for South Africa by 1930. These policies included neglect of 
development in Botswana itself, cooperation and collaboration with South 
African labor recruiters, failure to challenge a South African embargo against 
African-owned cattle from Botswana, and land alienation. 
*The research for this paper was funded jointly by Fulbright-Hays, the 
Social Science Research Council, and American Council of Learn·ed Societies. 
However, the conclusions, and opinions expressed in this paper are those of 
the author alone. 
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Precolonial Society in Botswana 
The brief analysis of the political, social, and economic structure of 
precolonial Tswana society that follows provides the background necessary for 
appreciating the process of change set in motion by European penetration into 
Botswana. Two major points are illustrated: first, that Tswana society was 
largely self-sufficient and reasonably prosperous, and second, that social and 
economic inequalities existed but were somewhat ameliorated by the redistrib-
utive function of the chieftainship. 
The earliest known inhabitants of what is today Botswana were the San 
peoples. Believed to have been hunter-gatherers, they are represented today 
by various groups referred to collectively as BaSarwa, or "Bushmen." The 
first Bantu-speaking group to settle in Botswana is thought to be the 
BaKgalagadi who arrived at the time of the original migration of Bantu-
speakers into southern Africa prior to 1000 A.D. They settled in the eastern 
portion of Botswana and mingled with the aboriginal BaSarwa. The largest of 
the Bantu-speaking groups now in Botswana, the Tswana, started to move into 
the region in the first half of the eighteenth century from the south and 
east. The Tswana and other immigrant Bantu-speaking groups displaced the 
earlier inhabitants, the BaSarwa and the BaKgalagadi. These two groups were 
forced to move westward into the region of the Kgalagadi Desert as the later 
arrivals settled in the better-watered areas in the east. (See Map 1.) 
When the first Europeans arrived in what is today Botswana around 1800, 
there were five distinct Tswana groups, each with its own territory under the 
rule of a single paramount chief. They were joined in the mid-nineteenth 
century by three other Tswana groups fleeing European encroachment in the 
Transvaal (Map 1). At the time of their first contact with Europeans, the 
Tswana lived on a combination of stock and crop farming and hunting and 
gathering. Control over access to land was the key to political power.4 
The right to allocate land was vested in the chief. While the holder of land 
enjoyed exclusive rights to its use and could pass these rights on to his 
heirs, sale or rent of land was forbidden. Fields for cultivation were 
located outside the villages and, prior to the adoption of the plow, were 
generally two or three acres in size. Most families had two or three fields 
spread in different localities to minimize the risk due to the highly erratic 
and localized rainfall. Cattle and small stock were generally kept at 
cattle-posts, often some distance from the village, and were tended by the 
sons or clients/serfs of the owner. 
There were no professional traders and no organized markets per se. Each 
household made most of its own clothing, ornaments, and utensils. Major tasks 
requiring a lot of labor -- such as the clearing of a field or the building of 
a hut -- could be carried out by organizing a work-party Oetsema) during 
which helpers would be given meat or beer in exchange for their help. A few 
specialized crafts such as metal work and pottery were practiced by certain 
families. Their products could be acquired through barter. 
The chiefs were the spiritual leaders of their people and derived much of 
their authority from their supernatural power to intercede between the people 
and the spirits of their ancestors. 5 The chief officiated at all major 
rituals, including ceremonies for rain-making, for inaugurating plowing, for 
blessing the harvest, and for protecting soldiers from harm before battle. In 
a society where secular and spiritual life were inseparable, the chief's 
supernatural powers were a major source of legitimacy and authority. 
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Map 1 
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The major social divisions in the tribe reflected the original basis of 
tribal membership. Schapera refers to three different social strata in 
traditional Tswana society: nobles (dikgosana), consisting of descendants of 
any former chief; commoners (batlhanka), being the descendants of aliens 
incorporated into the tribe long ago; and immigrants (bafaladi), being people 
of recent admission to the tribe. 6 Rank in power and wealth descended in 
the same order. The chief was usually assisted in his rule by senior male 
relatives drawn from the dikgosana. The chief favored his relatives (and 
himself) in the distribution of crop and grazing land. To offset the risk of 
rivalry for power from members of the dikgosana, chiefs often created close 
economic ties of dependency with members of the politically less powerful 
batlhanka. 7 One means of doing this was to lend (mafisa) royal cattle to 
selected batlhanka families. In return for their loyalty, these families were 
allowed to use the cattle for plowing and for milk. 
In general, commoners and recent immigrants suffered under a kind of 
second-class citizenship. In judicial disputes, for example, immigrants were 
likely to be more harshly judged than longstanding tribal members. Hence the 
saying, "Lesepa legolo la moeng, la mong wa gae le pitikwa ke dikhukhane." 
( "The dung of a stranger is great, that of a citizen is rolled away by the 
beetles") .8 Further, those of foreign descent were made to pay special 
tribute to the chief, and it was considered degrading for a member of the 
ruling community to marry a foreigner.9 
In addition to these three strata, there were the 11clients 11 (malata), 
sometimes referred to as serfs or slaves.10 These were drawn mainly from 
the BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi groups. Unable to resist the encroachment of the 
Tswana, they were either driven westward into the desert or 11adopted 11 as 
servants by the Tswana chiefs and other leading tribesmen. They were socially 
and politically inferior to all other groups, having no right to participate 
in the tribal courts or in the tribal meetings. These clients were handed 
down from father to son and were expected to provide labor and tribute to 
their masters. They had no rights to land or property of their own. 
While this four-tiered system of social ranking was not completely rigid, 
power and wealth based on favored access to land and cattle and the labor of 
the clients generally accrued to the chief and his near relatives among the 
dikgosana. These social divisions in Tswana society were to play a 
significant role in Botswana I s incorporation into the migrant labor system. 
The chiefs, with their centralized authority, proved to be valuable 
intermediaries for the British in imposing colonial policies leading to labor 
migration. The middle stratum of immigrants and commoners provided the bulk 
of migrants, while the serfs/client at the bottom of the social ladder were 
restrained from migrating by their ties of dependency with the dikgosana. 
Within each of the Tswana tribal areas, there was a similar trilocal 
settlement pattern. Each tribe had a princpal village where the majority of 
people maintained a home. These villages often had de jure populations in 
excess of ten thousand.11 The bulk of the major village residents, however, 
only resided there during the winter months. When the chief announced the 
time for plowing, the people would move to the area of their agricultural 
lands and stay there for five to seven months until after the harvest. In 
addition, those families with cattle also maintained homes at their cattle-
post areas. 
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This trilocal form of settlement, necessitating as it did continued 
movement between different resource bases, represented an effective adaptation 
to the ecological conditions within which the Tswana operated. The removed' 
location of the fields .made possible extensive use of land for cultivation --
including the dispersal of fields to minimize the problem of highly localized 
rainfall and perhaps to permit shifting cultivation to achieve maximum yields 
from what were generally very light soils. The even further removal of the 
cattle posts afforded greater areas of grazing land and precluded troublesome 
competition between arable and pastoral pursuits (for example, in the form of 
livestock trampling and eating crops). The relatively sparse human population 
densities at both lands and cattle posts meant that both areas were also 
suitable for hunting and gathering activities, either as a supplement to crop 
and animal husbandry or as a partial replacement in times of severe drought. 
The centralized political authority of the chief allowed for the provision 
of aid to tribal members in times of drought or hardship. The chief received 
tribute from his subjects in the form of cattle, meat, ivory, skins, and 
grain.12 This tribute was not meant entirely for the chief's own use and 
enjoyment, but was regarded essentially as "tribal property." As the holder 
of tribal wealth, the chief was duty-bound to care for the indigent among his 
followers and to provide grain in the not infrequent times of drought. So it 
was said, 11Kgosi, o jesa morafe. 11 ("The chief feeds the nation. 11 )13 He was 
expected to use the fruits of specially designated and communally worked 
"tributary fields" (masotla) to feed the needy. 
According to the earliest existing written account of Tswana life, dating 
from 1801, the Tswana were fairly prosperous in their way of life: 
The Booshuanas (sic) are arrived at that stage of civil-
ization which is not satisfied with the mere necessities 
of life supplied to them abundantly from the three sources 
of agriculture, grazing, and hunting; they are by no means 
insensible of its convenience and luxuries.14 
Al though there was apparent prosperity among the Tswana, there was also 
clearly scope for conflict in what is sometimes referred to as the "Tswana 
tributary mode of production." While there has been a tendency among social 
scientists working within the underdevelopment framework to overemphasize the 
social harmony and stability of precolonial modes of production, it should be 
stressed that in case of the Tswana, precolonial life was hardly Utopian. 
There was constant conflict within and among the different Tswana groups over 
control of economic resources. Their internal social structure, ranked 
ultimately on increasing control over access to land and cattle -- with the 
defeated aboriginal people and alien immigrants at the bottom and a powerful 
royalty at the top -- was neither politically nor economically egalitarian. 
The transformation of Botswana into a labor reserve was to have different 
effects on t.he different social strata. A number of chiefs, for example, 
found collaboration with the colonial administration in inducing labor 
migration highly remunerative.15 At the other end of the social scale, the 
semi-feudal web in which the malata (serfs/clients) were embedded made labor 
migration impossible for many of them. For most people however, the effect of 
colonial rule was to create new economic demands and needs, while undercutting 
their ability to fulfill these needs. The result was a breakdown in what had 
been a largely self-sufficient economy and the canalization of people into the 
South African migrant labor system. 
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The Beginnings of Labor Migration 
The concept of wage labor was alien to the Tswana way of life until 
contact with Europeans was made. From about 1800 onwards an intermittent flow 
of European hunters, adventurers, and missiona·ries began to visit Botswana. 
They introduced the material goods of Western society and started exchange 
relationships built on trade involving ostrich feathers, ivory, and skins. By 
1870, there were trading stores established in nearly all the major villages 
of the Tswana tribes in Botswana. At about the same time permanent mission 
stations were established in each tribal area. 
Soon after the Boer Voortrekkers moved into Tswana areas in the 
contemporary Transvaal in the 1830s, they began to force Africans to work for 
them. Eventually, conflict between Boer settlers and indigenous Africans over 
rights to labor and land in the Transvaal forced a number of Tswana groups to 
flee the area. Between 1850 and 1870, three Tswana groups -- the BaKgatla, 
BaMalete, and BaTlokwa -- migrated from the Transvaal to Botswana as a result 
of this Boer encroachment.16 In each case the land left behind was larger 
and/or agriculturally superior. 
In 1868, diamonds were discovered at Kimberley in South Africa. This 
discovery gave rise to the first extensive outflow of labor from Botswana. 
Tswana workers were attracted by the possibility of earning enough money to 
purchase firearms (for hunting and for defense) and came from as far north as 
Shoshong in what is today Central District.17 Not all the migrants to the 
mines went simply to buy guns, however. A missionary stationed at Molepolole, 
the principal village of the BaKwena, commenting on the aftermath of a drought 
in 1872, reported that: 
Great numbers of the poorer people have for now been 
scattered in search of food, some in the hunting field, 
others among distant tribes who were more favored last 
season, others again went among the Boers and to the 
Diamond fields to earn a livelihood.18 
By 1880, there were 2,135 BaTswana working on the Kimberley diamond 
mines. These workers were mainly from the southeastern regions and included 
BaKwena, Bakgatla, and BaMangwato.19 In 1886, gold was discovered on the 
Witwatersrand near present-day Johannesburg. This created an immediate and 
fast-growing demand for cheap labor, a demand which was not to be entirely met 
until ninety years later. By 1899, some 100,000 African men were working on 
the gold mines around Johannesburg. While the bulk of these workers came from 
Mozambique, recruiting a tempts were made all over southern Africa, including 
Botswana. 
The response of the Tswana to the growing demand for labor in South Africa 
was geographically uneven. The BaMangwato, living astride the "road to the 
North" connecting the Cape with Rhodesia had prospered from the growth of 
trade and transport that came with European penetration into their area. (See 
Map 2.) The growth of long-distance trade in ivory, ostrich feathers, and 
karosses in exchange for imported goods (including beads, clothing, firearms 
and breeding stock) was a boon to the BaMangwato economy. 
This export trade was 
BaMangwato capital, Shoshong, 
nine trading stor_es and was 
flourishing by the 1850s.20 In 1878, the 
through which all north-south roads passed, had 
the principal stopping-over place for itinerant 
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traders operating between the Cape and the interior. Exports for that year 
reportedly included the tusks 'of twelve thousand elephants. In the 1880s 
trade in cattle and small stock for the Kimberley diamond mines became 
important. And in the 1890s, the provision of food for traders and travellers 
passing through Shoshong in transit to the newly established territory of 
Rhodesia, became a major economi.c activity. In good crop years, the Mangwato 
chief, Khama III, allowed the sale of grain to the European traders and 
travellers. The chief himself was active in the sale and hiring-out of cattle 
and wagons, and benefitted handsomely from this economic activity. 
During this period of 
Mangwato area was small. 
among the BaMangwato was 
Khama. 21 
largely mercantile growth, 
In 18 "", the first labor 
apologetically supplied 
labor migration from the 
recruiter to seek labor 
with only 105 men by 
In 1896-189", a rinderpest epidemic killed an estimated 90 percent of the 
cattle in Botswana.22 Because cattle represented the principal form of 
wealth and production for the Tswana, the consequences were severe and long-
lasting. Many of those people without cash savings, large stores of grain, or 
some surviving cattle were forced to migrate in search of employment. Food 
relief from England was jealously refused by a number of the chiefs who saw it 
as an infringement on their prerogative to be the benefactors of their 
people. 23 Al though reliance on participation in the growing cash economy 
including labor migration in time of drought -- predated the rinderpest, it 
definitely was deepened by this natural calamity. 
Not all the Tswana groups were equally affected by the loss of their 
cattle. The BaMangwato were able to resist proletarianization. Their 
involvement in trade and victualling helped to carry them through the crisis 
without resorting to labor migration on a large scale. In 1896, Chief Khama 
refused an offer by one South African mine to pay a thousand men £3-5 a month 
and to erect a trades school in Shoshong. He did supply 150 men to work on 
the gold mines in either 1896 or 189 7, but in 1898 he banned labor recruitment 
for the gold mines -- reportedly because of the high mortality rate among 
those of his people who had previously gone to work. The resident 
commissioner described conditions in the southern portion of the country in 
1896 as follows: "All the tribes, except perhaps Linchwe's (the BaKgatla) 
are at present very short of food, and many have not had means of purchasing 
sufficient for their families. They are, however, making an effort to obtain 
money for the purpose of buying food by going out to work at Kimberley, 
Jagersfontein, Johannesburg, or other places. "25 
Not everyone saw the destruction of the cattle economy and the ensuing 
need for men to seek work as a bad thing. The ·representative of the London 
Missionary Society stationed at Molepolole, reported that: 
The loss of their cattle has driven large numbers to seek 
work. Certainly the best thing that could happen as far 
as teaching them the value of labour is concerned. Work 
was the last thing thought of except among the poorer 
classes and with these the period rarely exceeded six 
months. All that is altered. A generation will pass 
before this country will recover its lost wealth in 
cattle •••• 26 
Map 2 
Trade Routes in the Tswana Region 
(c. 1850-1890) 
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While the missionaries had 
considered eligible for it. 
family was helped "where the 
a food relief program, not all the poor were 
The missionary in Molepolole saw to it that no 
father was in good health and able to work."27 
The hardships resulting from the rinderpest were compounded in the 
southern districts by drought and locusts leading to near total crop failures 
in 1895, 1896, and 1897.28 As a result, people were reported to be 
suffering from starvation and malnutrition throughout the southern 
Protectorate. The chief of the BaMalete wrote to the assistant commissioner 
in October 1896 that his people had been "dying for the past two months or so 
at the rate of three and four a day, "29 and in 189 °, fifteen hundred people 
were reported to have died at Kanye in the Ngwaketse area from a plague.30 
Not all the social strata were equally affected by the rinderpest 
disaster. The wealthier tribal members, who had some surviving cattle and 
some grain to sell, reaped a handsome profit from the suddenly increased 
demand. By 189 7, the price of provisions, in the words of one buyer, were 
"enormous" -- mules, £20; salted oxen £25; mealies £ 7sl0 a bag; flour at an 
average of £10 or £12; meat at ls/6d per pound.31 Among Khama's people the 
provision of food relief provided windfall profits for those who still had 
trek oxen.32 Having refused to accept relief grain on behalf of the tribe, 
Khama announced that people were free to go on their own to fetch the grain 
from the railhead at Gaborone. They could then share in its sale or use 
according to the number of cattle they had contributed to the span. Since the 
people who were likely to have trek oxen at this time either had large herds 
before the rinderpest or were among the few who could afford to buy salted 
oxen, this ensured that relief grain went to those who least needed it. 
While it is not clear what proportion of the population was forced into 
wage labor by the rinderpest, many Tswana from the southern areas sought work 
in South Africa. The rapid development of the mining industry meant that the 
jobs were there. The resident commissioner for the Protectorate complained in 
1898 that the territory was: 
••• flooded by both white and coloured persons calling 
themselves Labour Agents, persons, who in most cases do 
not care to work for themselves, but who visit the country 
to try and induce the Natives by flattering promises to go 
to Johannesburg to work in the mines ••• 33 
Between November 1896 and December 1898, the Rand Native Labour Association 
recruited 2,068 men in the Protectorate for the South African gold mines.34 
At least that many men again would have been working on the Kimberley diamond 
mines. Because of this, the resident commissioner commented in 1898 that "So 
many men have gone [out to work] that most of the villages present quite a 
deserted appearance. "35 
Colonial Policies Affecting Labor Migration 
The British decision to form a protectorate in Botswana in 1885 was not 
inspired by any great interest in exploiting the productive wealth of the 
territory. Given the erratic rainfall, poor soils, and belief (recently 
proven false) that Botswana lacked any mineral wealth, interest in acquiring 
land for economic exploitation was not a major goal of colonization. 
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Initial British interest in Botswana was mainly negative -- to pre-empt 
the rights of other imperial powers to the territory. Specifically, Britain 
wanted to keep the territory out of the hands of both the Germans who were 
rumored at the time to have designs on expanding their colonial stake eastward 
from South West Africa into Botswana, and the Boer settlers who had by that 
time regained control over the Transvaal and who, it was feared, might have 
designs on moving westward. 
In 1885, the "Scramble for Africa" was at its height. The British saw 
their imperial dream of eventual British control and freedom of movement from 
"Cape to Cairo" potentially threatened on both sides. If the way to the north 
(particularly to Zimbabwe with its rumored mineral wealth) was to be protected 
from competing imperial interests, then it was imperative that Botswana -- no 
matter how worthless the land itself might seem -- be "protected." With the 
aid of the strong lobbying efforts of the British missionaries who had been 
active in Botswana since the 1820s and who wielded considerable influence over 
the major Tswana chiefs, it was an 
territory a protectorate in 1885. 
preferable to German or Boer rule. 
easy matter for 
To the chiefs, 
the British to declare the 
British rule was seen as 
The British later assumed that they would be able to transfer control of 
the territory to Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) • 
However, staunch resistance to such a move, led by the missionaries and the 
major tribal leaders, and Rhodes's embarrassing complicity in the Jameson Raid 
debacle forced the Colonial Office in 1895 to reject the BSAC's plan to incor-
porate Botswana. Later, there were attempts to have the Protectorate 
incorporated into South Africa. 36 - But the election of the Nationalist Party 
government in 1948 and the subsequent official entrenchment of racism in South 
Africa made such a transfer politically unacceptable in international circles. 
The continued British interest in giving up direct rule in Botswana first 
to the BSAC and later to South Africa was indicative of their lack of interest 
in the territory. The resident commissioner succinctly expressed the British 
attitude ·in 1888, 
The country is neither an Arcadia nor a 
objects for which it was annexed, namely the 
the natives and the retention of the trade 
desert. The 
protection of 
route to the 
interior have been accomplished. For the rest, the Colony 
must be content to advance slowly, and to dispense with 
many desirable improvements until it is in a position to 
pay for them. 3 7 
It is not surprising, therefore, that it was partly through a policy of 
neglect that the colonial government aided Botswana 1 s transformation into a 
labor reserve. In addition to this overriding policy of neglect, there were 
more active policies which encouraged this transformation. These active 
policies were relatively muted in comparison with what occurred in neighboring 
colonies. For example, because the land was considered poor, the alienation 
of land for the exclusive use of white settlers and prospectors in Botswana 
was not nearly as severe as in Swaziland, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. 
The imposition of taxes and the consequent creation of a need for wage employ-
ment to pay them was not carried as far as in Malawi or in the Ciskei, where 
specific "labor taxes" were instituted to provide punitive levies on those who 
did not work for Europeans. Similarily, the cooptation of traditional author-
ities into actively representing and serving the interests of the colonial 
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administration did not proceed as far as it did in Zimbabwe or South Africa, 
where chiefs became fully salaried employees of the settler regimes. In 
addition, active restrictions on African economic development were not so 
serious as in Zimbabwe and parts of South Africa, where laws and differential 
pricing discriminated against the African production of certain cash crops. 
Nevertheless, all of these standard colonial practices for encouraging the 
creation of a wage labor force -- land alienation, taxation, cooptation of 
leadership, and restrictions on independent development -- were to be found in 
Botswana. If their presence was not so obvious, it was because the relatively 
poor ecological base and the pre-existing situation of social and economic 
inequality lent themselves more readily to a process of proletarianization 
than those found in other territories. Once cash needs had been created and 
the cooperation of the tribal authorities had been enlisted, it was relatively 
easy for the colonial administration in Botswana to induce people to seek 
employment. 
Before 1899, the British colonial presence in Botswana was largely 
nominal. Other than settling some disputes regarding boundaries and 
concessions, and providing grain for relief during the rinderpest, the 
colonial administration maintained an extremely low profile. Once the 
founding of the Protectorate had secured the road to the north from the 
Germans and Boers, Britain's major concern in Botswana was in recouping the 
costs of its administration.38 
At a conference held in 1892 to discuss the possibility of collecting 
revenue in the Protectorate, the resident commissioner decided that the cost 
of tax collection in money and "danger" (that is, the danger of African 
resistance) would outweigh the benefits. 39 It was assumed that British rule 
would soon be handed over to the British South Africa Company. When that 
possibility fell away in 1895, there was greater concern about making the 
Protectorate pay for itself. Demonstrating their political astuteness, three 
chiefs who visited England in 1895 to argue for continued protectorate status 
made a point of their willingness to aid in the collection of revenue. 
Your petitioners have offered on more than one occasion to 
pay Hut Tax and they venture to repeat the offer made by 
the chiefs to his excellency the High Commissioner, dated 
Feb. 13, 1895. But your petitioners earnestly pray that 
Her Majesty's Government will not hand them over to the 
Chartered company or to the Cape Colony.4O 
Unfortunately for the British, the rinderpest- epidemic rendered the 
collection of taxes impractical until 1899, when a Hut Tax of ten shillings 
per dwelling was proclaimed. There is evidence that such taxes were insti-
tuted specifically to force people to seek work in a number of other British 
colonies in southern Africa for example, in Malawi, 41 the Cape 
Colony, 42 and in Zimbabwe. 43 While no historical record has been found to 
date which shows decisively that forcing men into wage labor was the primary 
purpose of the Hut Tax in Botswana,44 the colonial officials were well aware 
that the introduction of such a tax would necessitate such a movement. In at 
least one instance (discussed below), the tax was purposely used to force men 
to go work on the South African gold mines. Given the paucity of cash-earning 
opportunities in Botswana, taxation and labor migration were two sides of the 
same coin. The assistant commissioner for the Protectorate noted shortly 
after the tax was introduced that "it has a two-fold advantage: it drives the 
young men to work and it raises revenue. 1145 
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If the tax revenue had been used to develop the domestic economy of the 
Protectorate, it and the labor migration it spawned could perhaps be justified 
as the short-term cost of long-term growth. However, most of the revenue 
generated in the Protectorate was used to cover the costs of administration 
and the small surplus left for social services and economic development was 
expended disproportionately for the benefit of the tiny white settler 
population. Hermans, in his review of the financial history of Botswana 
concludes that 
It is quite clear that nothing occurred between 1885 and 
1955 which contributed significantly to Botswana's econ-
omic and financial development •••• The policies pursued by 
the British Government did not recognize political and 
economic development as an objective. Financial assist-
ance, when it was provided, was given only to enable a 
minimally acceptable level of essential public services to 
be maintained.46 
Between 1912 and 1932 -- a period during which the Protectorate operated 
entirely on domestic revenue -- expenditure on the police and on central and 
district administration accounted for 80 percent of the annual budget.4 7 
The provision of health and education facilities was left almost entirely to 
the missionaries and the tribal authorities. The annual government expen-
diture on horse rations and transport maintenance for the police surpassed 
expenditure on education in every year prior to 1930.48 At independence in 
1966, there was not a single government-sponsored secondary school in the 
country. The health sector was little better: tuberculosis was recognized as 
a major problem in the country in 1930s but went untreated until the 1950s. 
An analysis of revenue and expenditure estimates done by the financial 
secretary for the Protectorate in 1921 revealed that a smaller share of the 
revenue was collected at the expense of the "European" population than of the 
"Native" population, and that a disproportionately large share was expended on 
the white settler population (about five hundred families).49 Using the 
figures in Table 1, the financial secretary projected that in 1921-1922 
roughly £53 per adult male head would be expended for the benefit of whites as 
opposed to £1.8s per adult male head for Africans. In education, as late as 
1960, eighteen times as much was being spent on the education of every white 
child enrolled as on every African child.SO 
The Protectorate administration pursued a policy of racial discrimination 
in economic affairs as well. Khama III was forced to give up his interest in 
a profitable trading store once it started to compete with white traders. 51 
Subsequently there was a de facto policy of not granting general trading 
licenses to Africans. 52 Africans were also not allowed to buy farms in the 
freehold farming blocks. In 1913, when an African applied to buy a white farm 
in Ghanzi Block, the resident commissioner was directed by the high commis-
sioner to turn down the application, although there were no legal grounds for 
doing so. 53 He was instructed to offer no explanation and to leave it to 
the "native" to challenge the decision. With regards to the marketing of 
cattle, a South African law which discriminated against the sale of African 
cattle from Botswana was allowed to stand for more than ten years, despite the 
fact that it was in contradiction of a customs union agreement between the two 
countries. 54 
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In 1932, an official "Commission of Enquiry into the Financial and 
Economic Condition of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland" was carried out 
by the Colonial Office.55 The report of the Commission (the Pim Report) 
criticized Britain's neglect of the three territories as shortsighted. The 
taxes in Botswana were described as burdensome in relation to the income of 
the people. 56 It was noted that men faced with the obligation of paying hut 
tax had only two choices: to sell all their possessions to the white traders 
or to sell their labor power to the white economy. The latter choice, it was 
pointed out, implied migration to South Africa since there were only a handful 
of employment opportunities in Botswana itself. The report also found that 
the whites in the territory benefitted disproportionately from government 
expenditure on education, and that loans for agricultural development were not 
available to Africans. 
The major recommendations of the Commission for Botswana were that the 
Colonial Office end its policy of neglect and provide grants-in-aid for 
development projects. While the report did usher in eight years of small 
budgetary supplements from the Crown, the outbreak of World War II interrupted 
t:he flow, and it was not resumed again at a meaningful level until 1955. 5 7 
It was only the urgency of the independence movement which prompted Britain to 
make more substantial budgetary contributions in the 1960s. 
The same general pattern held for the provision of development funds and 
loans: almost nothing prior to 1932, a small amount from then until 1955, and 
a small but steady increase from 1955 until independence in 1966. Even then, 
t:he annual development budget in the ten years prior to independence averaged 
only £1. 4 million, or £3 per person per year. 58 As a result Botswana faced 
independence with the worst physical and social service infrastructure of any 
country in southern Africa. 
The principal source of revenue for the Protectorate administration from 
1899 until 1932 was the hut tax. It accounted for 40 percent of total revenue 
between 1900 and 1930 and in some years comprised as much as 60 percent.59 
When the hut 'tax was introduced in 1899, the colonial administration had 
neither the manpower nor the legitimacy to collect the tax directly. The 
actual tax collection was done by the tribal chiefs who personally received 10 
percent of the receipts. In the first year of tax collection, Chief Khama's 
10 percent share amounted to £309.60 By 1916, he was earning no less than 
£1 700 in this manner. 61 
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE BY RACE: 1921-1920 
( E sterling) 
Head 
Pensions 
Police 
Legal 
Administration 
Posts 
Customs 
Miscellaneous 
Public works 
Medical 
Education 
Veterinary 
Native Tax 
Census 
Total: 
Per Adult male: 
nNat ive 0 
2,000 
3,602 
1, 39 7 
27,503 
2,532 
914 
2,200 
3,601 
645 
8,115 
5,025 
600 
58,134 
n. 8s. 
European 
664 
2,946 
1,143 
22,825 
2,070 
50 
74 7 
1,800 
1,000 
1,073 
2,462 
100 
36,886 
f:53 
Source: Botswana National Archives, sl4/l, European Advisory council Minutes, 
1921. 
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This arrangement put the chiefs in a position where the encouragement of 
migrant labor was in their financial interest. This led to abuses of chiefly 
authority. Men were often forced to seek work by the chief in order to pay 
their tax. Seepapitso I of the BaNgwaketse, for example, announced at a 
tribal meeting in 1911 that all members of certain age-regiments who were 
unable to pay their tax should be recruited for the South African mines.62 
In the same year, he proclaimed that anyone unable to pay taxes would be sent 
abroad to work for his tax money. The mine recruiters had by this time 
evolved a system (which is still in effect) by which they would pay a man's 
taxes as an advance on his future wages. Thus, mine recruitment became a 
favorite way to raise revenues for the administration and a number of the 
chiefs. 
This practice of "encouraging" people to work in order to raise money for 
the chief or for tribal purposes predated the hut tax. Lentswe I of the 
BaKgatla, for example, sent an entire age-regiment to the Kimberley diamond 
mines around 1880 to earn money for the purchase of firearms for the 
tribe.63 Succeeding BaKgatla age-regiments were similarly sent to work to 
raise money for tribal purposes.64 Evidence exists of similar taxing 
arrangements among the BaMalete, BaKwena, BaKhurutshe, and BaTlokwa.65 
The charge that a number of chiefs benefitted from the "selling" of their 
people into migrant labor is not entirely without foundation. Although the 
colonial administrators officially maintained that no one was being forced out 
of the Protectorate to work, they knew some chiefs were sending people out to 
work in order to callee t taxes, and that some were even being employed by 
South African recruiting companies.66 Rarely did the Protectorate adminis-
tration get directly involved. In 1934, however, a sudd.en increase in demand 
for mine labor in South Africa resulted in active collaboration between the 
administration, a chief, and the South African mining companies in using the 
hut tax to force men out to work. An increase in the international price of 
gold in 1933 led to a rapid rise in demand for African labor on the South 
African gold mines. 6 7 In an attempt to increase the flow of labor without 
having to increase the level of wages, the South African Chamber of Mines 
decided to expand its recruiting zone unto the areas north of the Tropic of 
Capricorn. Recruiting in these tropical areas had been banned by the British 
government in 1913 because of the very high death rates experienced by 
tropical workers on the mines -- sixty per thousand per annum in 1912.68 In 
order to convince the British Government that the newly developed Lister anti-
pneumococcal vaccine would be effective in protecting such workers, the 
Chamber of Mines devised an experiment in which 2,000 tropical workers would 
be recruited, vaccinated, and monitored. Some 800 of these experimental 
recruits were earmarked to come from northern Botswana.69 
When the experiment was announced in 1934, the resident commissioner in 
Botswana welcomed the idea and offered the mine recruiting organization, 
"Wene la," full police and medical support. 70 When the three months allotted 
for recruitment for the experiment were nearly over and not enough recruits 
had been found, he took more active steps. He directed the resident 
magistrate and the medical officer in the area to accompany the chief's tax 
collector on a tour of several villages. The magistrate later reported back 
to the resident commissioner that 
At each of the places visited I selected all able-bodied 
men and had them lined up and examined by the Medical 
Officer for general fitness. I made it very clear that 
they were not being coerced into going to the mines or 
anything else but that if they failed to do something 
towards paying their hut tax they would have to take the 
consquences . . 
The quota for recruitments North 
been completed and I have agreed with 
Wenela representative) that it would be 
forth another 400 recruits. 71 
of 220 south has 
Mr. Stubbs (the 
possible to send 
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Even though the death rate among "tropical 11 mine workers was found to be 
7. percent higher than among the other workers, the experiment was declared a 
success in April 1938. 72 By 1941, there were 22,000 "tropicals" working on 
the South African mines, comprising 6 percent of the African mine labor 
force. In the decade following the sudden rise in gold prices in 1931, the 
African labor force on the mines increased by 150,000 men while cash wages 
increased by only one cent (from R0.22* to R0.23 per shift). 73 
The collaboration among the Protectorate administration, a chief, and the 
South African mining companies during the tropical experiment illustrates a 
pattern of de facto collusion which had existed since 1899 when the hut tax 
was first instituted. All three benefitted from the hut tax: the admini-
stration was able to balance its budget, the chiefs received considerable 
personal income, and the mines, industries, and farms of South Africa were 
assured a steady supply of cheap labor. In contrast, the recruits in the 
tropical experiment were coerced into assuming the role of human guinea pigs. 
A fine of£ 5 or a sentence of up to five months of hard labor was imposed on 
those unable to pay the hut tax. 74 In addition, a mine recruit was required 
to work out his contract, which usually lasted nine to twelve months. 
Desertion was a penal offence under both South African and Protectorate law, 
This meant that no matter how dangerous or unhealthy living and working 
conditions were on a mine, a man was not free to leave until his contract was 
completed. 
The Protectorate administration favored such laws. When a proposed 
International Labour Convention on migrant labor called such laws into 
question in 1936, the resident commissioner opposed ratification on grounds 
the convention would offend the South Africans and jeopardize the flow of 
labor from Botswana. 75 Like many colonial officials, the commissioner felt 
strongly that "the Natives" should be made to work. Since Africans were not 
yet fully proletarianized, he felt that the penal sanctions for desertion were 
necessary in order to keep them on the job. 76 
The law against desertion remained in effect. As a result, the most basic 
right of a worker -- the right to withhold his/her labor power by either 
refusing to work or by walking off the job was denied workers from 
Botswana. If apprehended, deserters from the mines were usually given the 
choice of paying a fine, going to prison, or returning · to the mines to 
complete their contract. 77 
A colonial official accused of "taxing" men into becoming migrant workers 
could always have replied that the men were free to make their tax money in 
* R 1.00 = $1,20, 
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other ways. In Botswana, with its limited employment opportunities, the only 
other feasible source of cash income was the sale of cattle. A missionary 
stationed at Shoshong actually complained in 1912 that the ability of people 
to pay their tax by selling cattle was making them "indolent and shift-
less." 78 The Annual Report for the Protectorate for the same year noted 
that Africans realized a sum of nearly £70,000 through the sale of stock and 
that this enabled them "to pay their hut tax without difficulty." 
While such reports were oversimplifications -- since a large portion of 
the population had no cattle to sell -- it is true that the cash economy of 
the country was heavily dependent on the availability of a market for cattle. 
Until the discovery of diamonds, copper, and nickel in the late 1960s, cattle 
were the major export of the country, accounting for more than two-thirds of 
the value of "visible" (i.e., non-labor) exports in most years. Unfortunately 
for the BaTswana the cattle export market proved to be extremely erratic. This 
was partly due to sporadic outbreaks of cattle diseases which rendered the 
cattle unfit for consumption. In 1933, 1934, and 1947, for example, hoof and 
mouth disease caused a drastic drop in cattle exports. (See Table 2.) There 
was another more serious form of restriction, however, which resulted in the 
closure of South African markets to African cattle for sixteen years and whose 
legitimacy was highly questionable. 
In 1910, Botswana, together with Swaziland and Lesotho, entered into a 
customs union with South Africa which guaranteed all parties free access to 
each others' markets. In the case of Botswana, a major benefit of this 
arrangement was access to the cattle market of South Africa. Yet, between 
1924 and 1941, restrictions were imposed on this access which clearly 
abrogated the customs union agreement. 
In 1919, the wholesale price of beef in South Africa began to drop and 
continued to fall until the outbreak of World War II. 80 Almost immediately, 
ranchers in South Africa began to call for restrictions on the importation of 
cattle from surrounding territories in order to limit supply and support 
prices. In 1923, South Africa established an 800 lbs. live-weight minimum on 
cattle imported from the High Commission Territories. No time limit was set 
on the restriction. The South Africans had offered a total embargo as their 
only alternative to the weight restriction While such a restriction 
violated the 1910 Customs Union Agreement, the British were unwilling to 
contest it. Withdrawing from the Customs Union would have necessitated 
establishing separate and expensive customs facilities in each territory. 
Weight restrictions were imposed because they had the advantage of 
curtailing the export of cattle owned by Africans, which were generally below 
the minimum weight level, while permitting the continued export of white-owned 
cattle, which were generally of better quality and therefore heavier.Bl As 
most of the white ranchers in Botswana were of South African origin, if not 
citizenship, there was a desire on the part of the South African government to 
allow them to continue exporting cattle. Weight restrictions made this 
possible. 
After 1926, when the weight restrictions were made even more stringent 
1,100 lbs. for oxen and 840 lbs. for cows -- they began to have a serious 
effect on Botswana (Table 2). Although some of the drop in cattle sold in 
South Africa was compensated for by increased sales in other markets, the 
prices offered in these markets were considerably lower than those in South 
Africa.82 
* 
* 
* 
Year 
1920/21 
1921/22 
1922/23 
1923/24 
1924/25 
1925/26 
1926/27 
1927 
1928 
1929 
TABLE 2 
CATTLE EXPORTS FROM BOTSWANA: 1920-1946 
(number of live cattle) 
To South Africa To Elsewhere 
30,519 1,931 
21,984 3,900 
21,317 4,729 
26,404 6,302 
17,993 7,169 
23,307 11,177 
7,976 23,913 
8,626 11,253 
11,964 18,096 
8,316 - 22,357 
1930 Embargo 9,810 18,367 1931 9,634 16,375 
1932 Years 10,510 14,593 
1933 715 
1934 1,071 1,800 
1935 20,388 4,189 
1936 16,843 2,179 
1937 7,295 1,220 
1938 19,114 2,456 
1939 19,240 5,194 
1940 19,610 14,158 
1941 22,432 10,577 
1942 33,721 11,212 
1943 30,597 12,334 
1944 26,019 9,140 
1945 30,346 11,658 
1946 34,907 12,807 
* Hoof and Mouth Disease was widespread. 
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Total 
32,450 
25,884 
26,046 
32,706 
25,162 
34,434 
31,889 
19,879 
30,060 
30,673 
28,177 
26,209 
25,103 
715 
2,871 
24,577 
19,022 
8,515 
21,570 
24,434 
33,768 
33,009 
44,933 
42,931 
35,159 
42,024 
46,994 
Source: S. J. Ettinger, "South Africa's Weight Restrictions on 
Cattle Exports from Bechuanaland, 1924-41", Botswana Notes and 
Records, Vol. 4, 1972, p. 24. 
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The cattle embargo, coupled with the periodic quarantines caused by 
disease, played an important role in increasing people's dependence on labor 
migration. In 1930, a white settler, disturbed by the government's failure to 
aid in local development, suggested that the embargo had been purposely placed 
by the South Africans to force Africans out to work: "Was it to show 
appreciation of our free output of labour that our neighbors put an embargo on 
our staple product -- cattle -- or, one wonders, was the idea to impoverish 
our natives to force more out to work beyond our boundaries? 0 83 
that 
In 1924, the London Missionary Society representative at Kanye reported 
No crops worth mentioning were reaped and as there was no 
sale for cattle owing to the Union embargo the people did 
not know what to do for food. Fortunately, a number of 
men were absorbed by the Johannesburg gold mines and 
others found employment at the Mafeking Diamond Diggings; 
by sending their wages home to their starving families 
they were able to keep them alive until the rains fell.84 
In the same year, the missionary at Molepolole reported that the embargo had 
brought trade to a standstill as "the only coin the native has is his cattle 
and they are worth nothing •••• 1185 
When the Protectorate lost its overseas market (the Italian Army) in 1933, 
the resident commissioner called the emb~rgo a "disaster. 1186 The Pim Report, 
released in the same year, came to much the same conclusion.87 Represen-
tations made to the South African government to lift restrictions were 
ineffectual. At the heart of the problem was the general disinterest on the 
part of the British government in the affairs of Botswana. In 1932, the 
acting resident commissioner, after meeting with the high commissioner to push 
for the removal of the restrictions, commented as follows: 
I gathered that we are entirely at the mercy of the Union 
in every way and unless the Home Government take more than 
a passing interest in our affairs we will be frozen out. 
I said so at the Conference and was told that His 
Majesty's Government has higher things to consider than 
the welfare of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.88 
Given Britain's attitude, it is not surprising that it was not until 1941, 
when the price of beef began to rise in response to the shortage caused by 
World War II, that the South African government, acting on its own, removed 
its weight restrictions.89 Table 2 shows that in the following year cattle 
exports to South Africa rose 50 percent. 
Aside from cattle, labor power was the only item readily available for 
sale. By the time the embargo was lifted in 1941, over 10 percent of the 
total population and nearly 30 percent of all working-age males had entered 
the migrant labor force.90 Britain's failure to insist on Botswana's right 
to unrestricted access to the markets of South Africa, as provided for in the 
1910 Customs Union Agreement, should be seen as the logical outcome of the 
pol icy of disinterest and drift which had begun with the creation of the 
Protectorate in 1885, and was to continue almost to the very day of 
independence. 
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Historically the most common means employed by colonial powers in the 
creation of wage labor forces has been the removal of land rights from 
subsistence farmers and peasants. In several countries in southern Africa, 
the alienation of African land for white settler use was the key to the 
creation of black labor reserves. In Zimbabwe and in Swaziland roughly 50 
percent of the land area was taken by white settlers. In South Africa, 8" 
percent of the land was taken by whites. For the Basotho, the loss of their 
best land in 1866 to Boer settlers in the Orange Free State was to be the key 
to Lesotho's later transformation into the archetypical labor reserve. 
Invariably, the land that was alienated in each of these cases included the 
most fertile land and the areas with known mineral deposits. 
In Botswana, although the total amount of land taken and transformed into 
white farming blocks amounted to less than 3 percent of the total land area of 
the country, it included a much larger percentage of the land which was suit-
able for agricultural use. Further, it created serious land shortages amoung 
several of the tribal groups immediately affected. Jones has calculated that 
there are roughly 4 million hectares of land suitable for cultivation in 
eastern Botswana. 91 Fully 15 percent of this land ~- including most of the 
land suitable for irrigation -- was alienated for exclusive white use during 
the Protectorate era.92 
Map 3 shows the alienated areas and land under semi-intensive use in 
eastern Botswana. The Lobatse, Gaberones, and Tuli Blocks were ceded 
originally to the British in 1895 as part of the right of way for the proposed 
railway line to Rhodesia. However, most of the railway passed west of these 
areas which were subsequently sold by the Crown to the British South Africa 
Company in 1904. They were later subdivided into ranches and sold or leased 
exclusively to whites.93 
The Tati Concession predated the founding of the Protectorate. It was 
originally a mineral concession made in 1880 by Lobengula, chief of the 
Matebele, to a group called the Northern Light Company. In 1888, the 
Concession was acquired by the Tati Concession and Mining Company. In 1911, 
due to what Sillery calls "bungling" in the Colonial Office, Lobengula' s 
original, limited mineral concession was transformed into full ownership for 
the company.94 Although gold was still being mined in the Tati Concession 
as late as 1930s, its mineral wealth was limited and eventually much of the 
concession was divided into white ranches. 
The impact of the alienation of these lands on the African people in each 
area was great. The BaTlokwa, as a result of the creation of the Gaberones 
Block, lost all their rights to land and became tenants of the British South 
Africa Company until a small reserve of 6" square miles was established for 
them in 1934. 95 The BaMalete reserve, created in 1909, consisted of the 
small piece of land (178 square miles) between the Gaberones and Lobatse 
Blocks. In the northeast, where rainfall and soils are somewhat better than 
in most of the rest of Botswana, the Tati Concession "bungle" of 1911 took 
from the indigenous Kalanga and Khurutshe peoples land once considered the 
"granary of Matebeleland. "96 The Kalanga and Khurutshe were left with a 
reserve of 244 square miles while the concession area consisted of 2,200 
square miles. As a result, like the BaTlokwa, many of the Kalanga and 
Khurutshe later became rent-paying tenants on what was formerly their own land. 
MAP 3 
Land Alienation in Eastern Botswana 
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TABLE 3 
POPULATION DENSITY AND OUTMIGRATION, 1943 AND 1971 
1943 1971 
% De jure % De jure 
People/ Population People/ Population 
District Sq. mile Absent Sq. mile Absent 
Tlokwa SE 
Malete · · 41 18 93 
Tati (N.E.) 28 18 86 
Barolong 12 17 28 
Kgatleng 5 18 10 
· Ngwaketse 3 16 9 
** 
Kweneng 3 14 5 
Mangwato 3 12 6 
Ngamiland 1 *** 2 
Kgalagadi o+ 2 *** o+ 
Ghanzi o+ 2 *** o+ 
Chobe o+ 1 *** o+ 
Notes: * 1943 absentee figures include men in the African Pioneer 
Corps away at war. 
17 
26 
17 
19 
17 
16 
11 
6 
9 
4 
8 
** Schapera's figure seems to be in error see Schapera, 1947, 
Table I. 
*** These figures are for male migrants only. 
Sources: Isaac Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1947, Tables I, IV, XII, XXX. 
Government of Botswana, 1971 Population Census, Gaborone, 
The Government Printer, 1972, Tables 1, 13-9. 
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The outcome of this loss of land was overcrowding, environmental deter-
ioration, and large-scale labor migration. By the 1940s the situation was so 
serious that Isaac Schapera was hired by the Protectorate administration to 
investigate the land shortage problem in the Tati, Tlokwa, and Malete 
reserves. In the Tati Reserve, he found that 19 percent of the married men 
lacked fields for plowing and that 50 percent of the families were living as 
fully resident tenants on Tati Company land.97 Among the Malete and Tlokwa, 
he found that 25 percent of married men lacked land to cultivate. Of . those 
married men without fields in these two tribes, some 71 percent had migrated 
in search of work (compared to 38 percent of those with fields). 98 Table 3 
lists the various tribal areas (districts) according to population density and 
outmigration in 1943 and 19 71. The districts with the highest rates of 
outmigration also had the highest population densities. The four highest 
rates of outmigration are in those districts bounded by blocks of alienated 
land. The higher rate of outmigration from these districts as compared to 
other districts is partly a consequence of the "squeeze" produced by settler 
encroachment on their boundaries. 
Summary 
By the late 1930s, Botswana had been transformed into a classic labor 
reserve -- underdeveloped and at the same time undermanned. On average, 28 
percent of adult males were away from home at any one time. The vast majority 
of these absentees were working in South Africa.99 Agricultural self-
sufficiency had been replaced by dependency on labor migration. An agricul-
tural survey done in 1941 found that "the great majority of families in each 
tribe reap either too little or barely sufficient for their needs. ulOO By 
1938, wages from employment in South Africa accounted for over 40 percent of 
total income.101 
The transformation of Botswana into a labor reserve for South Africa 
should not be seen as the automatic outcome of natural disasters and poor 
ecological conditions. Certainly natural factors played a role in the 
proletarianization process, but it was British colonial policy which insured 
the transformation of the country into a labor reserve. Major aspects of this 
policy were: (1) the overriding British policy of neglect and nondevelopment 
of local productive resources; (2) the related policy of pursuing a locally 
balanced budget primarily through the taxation of Africans; (3) the 
cooptation of tribal leadership; (4) cooperation and even collaboration with 
labor recruiting organizations in getting men to go to work; (5) the favoring 
of the white settler population in the allocation of Government expenditure; 
( 6) the subjugation of African interests to those of the white settlers and 
South Africans regarding the marketing of cattle; and ( 7) the alienation to 
white settlers of a significant proportion of the cultivable land in the 
country. The net result of these policies was the entrenchment of labor 
migration as a way of life over most of the Protectorate by the 1930s. 
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